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4.

Statement showing jurisdiction of the appellate court.
Defendant/appellee United States Automobile Association

(hereinafter "USAA") agrees with the Statement of Jurisdiction of
plaintiff/appellant Russell P. Calame (hereinafter "Calame").
5.

Statement of the issues.
USAA has no disagreement with Calame's Statement of Issues.

6.

Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes,

ordinances, and rules.
There are no determinative constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances or rules.
7.

Statement of the Case.
a.

Nature of the case.
Karen Burns McCoy sued Russell P. Calame in the Third

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah (the
"underlying action").

Calame had a homeowner's policy and an

umbrella policy with USAA.
McCoy suit to USAA.

Calame tendered the defense of the

USAA denied the tender, relying on the

business pursuit exclusions in the policies.

Calame sued USAA.

USAA answered and counterclaimed for declaratory relief on, inter
alia, the business pursuit exclusions.
b.

Course of the proceedings.
USAA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the

business pursuit exclusions.

Calame filed a cross-motion for

Summary Judgment.
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c.

Disposition at trial court.
The lower court granted USAA's Motion for Summary

Judgment and entered judgment finding that Calame had no coverage
under the policies and that USAA had no duty to defend Calame.
&.

Statement of the facts.
The following facts were set forth in USAA's Motion for

Summary Judgment, and were not disputed by Calame:
1.

Karen Burns McCoy filed a Complaint in the Third

Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah against Russell P. Calame and others.
underlying action").

A true and exact copy of McCoy's Complaint

is attached to Calame's Complaint herein.
2.

(Hereinafter, "the

(Record at 2-43.)

Russell P. Calame is, subject to their definitions,

terms, conditions, and exclusions, an insured under the USAA
Homeowner Policy and the USAA Umbrella Policy attached to
Calame#s Complaint herein.
3.

(Record at 44-65.)

The policies specifically exclude personal liability

coverage for injury arising out of business pursuits of an
insured.

The Homeowners Policy, at page 13 of 18, excludes

injury "arising out of or in connection with a business engaged
in by an insured."

(Record at 52.)

The Umbrella Policy, at page

5 of 6, excludes injury "arising from . . . a business
activity . . . "
4.

(Record at 64.)

In the underlying action, Karen Burns McCoy alleges

that Russell P. Calame "wrote and published a book for the
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purpose of obtaining profit . • . ."
paragraph 71).
5.
agent.

(Underlying Action,

(Record at 26.)

For 25 years, from 1947 to 1972, Calame was an FBI
(Calame depo, p 4f lines 3-9)

6.

Since 19 72 Calame has been self-employed doing

"investigative work."
7.

(Calame depo, p 4, line 13 to p 5, line 3)

One Bernie A. Rhodes wanted to write a book about the

two airplane hijacking cases of D.B. Cooper and Richard F. McCoy,
Jr. (Calame depo, pp 13-16)
8.

Rhodes and Calame entered into an oral agreement, later

memorialized in the written Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit
"A".

[Addendum, Tab A]

(Calame depo, pp 25, 31-33, 35-37 and

Calame depo Exhibit 1) Said Agreement recites that it was entered
into voluntarily by Rhodes and Calame "in connection with their
joint effort and endeavor to produce a book suitable for
publication concerning the skyjackings by Richard Floyd McCoy in
1972 and an individual generally spoken of as D.B. Cooper in
1971."

Said Agreement further recites that "Calame would handle

the research and investigation necessary to establish and verify
the facts and details as much as possible."

Said Agreement

further recited that "If the book produced any revenue . . . any
monies available would be paid out on the basis of 75% to Rhodes
as the author and 25% to Calame as the researcher.

This split

shall apply to any monies received from the endeavor . . . "
(Emphasis added.)
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9.

Rhodes had an agreement with the publisher, the

University of Utah Press, that provides for 10% royalties on case
bound copies and 7,5% on paperback copies.

(Calame depo, pp 43-

46, and depo Exhibit 2 at paragraph 13, attached hereto as
Exhibit "B".)
10.

[Addendum, Tab B].

A copy of the dust cover of the book is attached hereto

as Exhibit "C", and the dust cover recites "research by Russell
Calame."

(Calame depo, p 49, lines 5-13, and depo Exhibit 3).

[Addendum, Tab C].
11.

Within the month of August 1992 Calame expected to

receive $850 to $900 as monies from the endeavor.

(Calame depo,

p. 38, lines 17-19)
8.

Summary of the argument.
Calame was engaged in a business pursuit.

The business

pursuit exclusions in the USAA policies clearly and unambiguously
exclude coverage for business pursuits.

USAA was entitled to

summary judgment that Calame had no coverage in the underlying
action, and that USAA owed him no duty to defend.
9.

Detail of the argument.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
USAA WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE ACTS OF CALAME OF WHICH MCCOY
COMPLAINS IN THE UNDERLYING ACTION WERE A
BUSINESS PURSUIT NOT COVERED UNDER CALAME'S
POLICIES WITH USAA, AND THAT USAA HAS NO DUTY
TO DEFEND CALAME.
The Statement of Facts set forth above clearly establishes
that Calame was involved in a business pursuit.
case of first impression in the State of Utah.

This is not a
In Fire Insurance

Exchange v. Alsop. 709 P.2d 389 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme
Court stated that the primary purpose of a homeowners policy is
to provide package coverage for exposures incidental to home
ownership, and not to provide malpractice, professional, or
business liability insurance.
In Alsop. the insured was a chiropractor who rendered
treatment to a pregnant woman during labor and delivery of her
baby.

The mother and child were injured because of complications

in the delivery.

The mother sued for malpractice.

The chiro-

practor sought coverage under his homeowners policy.

The

insurance company sought and obtained a declaratory judgment from
the trial court that there was no coverage.
appealed.
judge.

The insured

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial

The Court stated that neither the activity nor the policy

language should be viewed in isolation, but should be looked at
into in light of practical common sense in relation to the
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pertinent circumstances.

The Court held in favor of the insurer,

denying coverage because of the business pursuit exclusion.
Calame's brief on appeal presents a few cases from other
jurisdictions, Minnesota, Kentucky, Georgia, Texas and Illinois,
that have found against insurers on business pursuit exclusions.
These cases, however, are not Utah cases and would have been
decided differently under the Alsop principle that the primary
purpose of a homeowner's policy is to provide coverage for
exposures incidental to home ownership, not to provide malpractice, professional, or business liability insurance. Moreover,
for every such non-Utah case, there is at least another non-Utah
case upholding the business pursuits exclusion.

For example, in

addition to the cases discussed in Point II, below, Liberty
Mutual•Insurance Company v. Miller, 549 S.2d 1200 (DCA Fl, 1989)
involved an insured doctor confronting a fellow physician regarding care and treatment of a mutual patient in which the insured
doctor pulled on the fellow physician's stethoscope while it was
draped around her neck.

Liberty Mutual prevailed on a declara-

tory judgment that its homeowner's policy did not provide
coverage.

The appellate court found that the injury arose out of

a business pursuit.
USAA v. Schneider, 620 F. Supp. 246 (D.C.N.Y. 1985), is a
very interesting case in which USAA prevailed on a declaratory
judgment against the infamous tennis pro John McEnroe that
McEnroe's altercation with a spectator at one of his matches

-9-

arose out of a business pursuit and was excluded from coverage
under McEnroe's homeowners policy with USAA.
In West American Insurance Company v. California Mutual
Insurance Company. 240 Cal.Rptr. 540 (C.A., Second Dist. 1987),
the appellate court found that the business pursuit exclusion
"logically includes any activity which arises from and is in the
course of an employee's employment," and that this exclusion even
attached where the insured's employees were injured in a Friday
afternoon altercation at the insured's home after playing pool
and dice and drinking beer.
The lead Utah case of Alsop. plus many cases from other
jurisdictions, hold that when an insured is engaged in a business
pursuit it is entirely proper for the trial court to grant
summary judgment that there is no coverage and no duty to defend.
This is the result that should attach to this case.

The lower

court properly entered judgment declaring no coverage and no duty
to defend.
POINT II
CALAME'S WORK ON D.B. COOPER, THE REAL MCCOY,
WAS AN ACTIVITY INCIDENTAL TO CALAME'S
"TRADE, PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION," AND WAS,
THEREFORE, A BUSINESS PURSUIT.
The business pursuit exclusion in Calame's homeowner's
policy excludes claims "arising out of or in connection with a
business engaged in by an insured."
"trade, profession or occupation."
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"Business" is defined as a
Similarly, the business

pursuit exclusion in Calame's umbrella policy excludes claims
arising from "the business, profession or occupation of an
insured."

Calame argues that his "trade, profession or occu-

pation" is not that of a book researcher and that, accordingly,
the business pursuit exclusions do not apply to preclude coverage
of those claims arising out of Calame's work on D.B. Cooper, The
Real McCoy.

But Calame's work on the book was incidental to his

profession as an FBI agent and private investigator and accordingly, pursuant to the business pursuit exclusions, there is no
coverage and no duty to defend on the part of USAA.
The controlling rule of law that should be applied in this
case is that the insured will be found to have been engaged in a
business pursuit when his activity is "incidental to his
employment."

American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nickerson, 813

F.2d 135, 136 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting North River Ins. Co. v.
Poos. 553 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Mo.Ct.App. 1977) (bodily injury claim
arising from bite by a wolf kept and cared for at the insured's
residence was excluded from coverage under policy excluding
injuries arising out of insured's business pursuits, in that
insured's keeping and caring for wolf at his residence was
incidental to insured's employment).

Calame was an FBI agent

from 1947 to 1972 and since then has been a private investigator.
He was admittedly sought out to work on the book, D.B. Cooper,
The Real McCoy, because of the substantial knowledge he had
gained as an FBI agent.

Certainly, his research for the book was
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incidental to his former work as an FBI agent and his ongoing
work as a private investigator.
In Davis v. Fredericks, Inc., 517 P.2d 1014 (Utah 1973), an
off-duty employee went out the rear door of a cafe. As he swung
open the door, it knocked down a woman passing by.

The defendant

employer, hoping for some insurance money to pay the woman's
damages, argued that because the employee was off-duty, the act
of walking out the door was a non-business activity and was
covered under a homeowners policy.

The Utah Supreme Court

disagreed, stating that the activity was incidental to the
business, and as such was not covered under the homeowners
policy.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge, who had

determined there was no coverage.
Calame argues that in order to qualify as a business
pursuit, the activity of the insured must be regularly engaged in
with the idea of earning a livelihood or living.

But, in

Nickerson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
reasoned decision of the trial court that "profit motive is
irrelevant to a business pursuits determination when the
questioned conduct is incidental to the insured's regular
employment."

Nickerson, 813 F.2d at 137.

In Nickerson, the

insurer brought an action seeking declaration of its rights under
a homeowner's policy issued to a policeman.

The trial court

held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the insurer had no
duty to defend or indemnify the insured policeman who, while off
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duty, shot a motorist in a car near the insured's home.

The off-

duty officer suspected the motorist was involved in a recent
incidence of burglaries in his neighborhood.

The insured argued

that he was acting incidental to his status as a homeowner,
father and neighbor.

The court rejected this argument and relied

upon the officer's own invocation of his official authority when
he approached the motorist, and the police manual imposing on
officers the obligation to respond to suspected criminal
activity, even when off duty.
Here Calame used and employed the skills and knowledge he
obtained as an officer of the FBI, and cultivated as a private
investigator, to establish and verify the facts and details of
the book.

Therefore, the activity was incidental to his regular

employment and it is immaterial that Calame did not undertake the
assignment and contract with Rhodes as the sole means of earning
a living.

It is worth reiterating, however, that Calame actively

sought, and successfully obtained, a written contract right to
receive 25% of all the revenue the book produced.

His efforts

cannot be said to be without profit motive.
Desormeaux v. Romero, 560 S.2d 658 (La.Ct.App. 1990), is a
case factually similar to the case at bar.

There, the insured, a

private investigator, brought an action against the insurer to
establish that the insurer had a duty to defend in a suit brought
against the insured for damages arising out of his alleged
defamatory statements.

The homeowner's policy issued by Valley
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Forge Insurance Company, and at issue in Desormeaux, excluded
coverage of claims arising out of the business pursuits of the
insured.

The Valley Forge policy defined "business" precisely

the same way it is defined in the policy at issue here.

In that

case, the insured was allegedly hired to attempt the release of a
convicted felon whose family claimed had been framed.

As part of

the alleged attempt to release the prisoner, the insured was made
a deputy sheriff in order to further his investigation.

The

allegations were that in the course of the insured's employment
as a private investigator, and in conjunction with his
investigative activities undertaken for the sheriff's office, the
insured had made defamatory statements.

The Louisiana Court of

Appeals held that these allegations were "unambiguously" excluded
from coverage under the homeowner's policy issued to the insured
by Valley Forge, and that Valley Forge had no duty to furnish a
defense to the insured.

Id. at 660.

Several cases from California indicate that an activity
which is not connected with the primary occupation of the
insured, or which may occur on a one-time basis, is nevertheless
properly excluded as an excluded business pursuit.

State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co. v. Drasin. 152 Cal.App. 3d 864, 199 Cal.Rptr. 749
(2d Dist. 1984), for example, involves an attorney who was
involved in a limited partnership.

After his suit against

another partner failed, Drasin was sued for malicious prosecution.

Drasin contended that his involvement in the partnership
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activities, since not in his capacity as an attorney, were not
business pursuits under his homeowners exclusion.
disagreed.

The court

After noting that part-time or supplemental income

projects had been considered "business pursuits" by other courts
and authorities, the court concluded:
"The Drasins, as stated in their own words, are engaged
in the partnership for profit and had been engaged in
such partnership for more than a year. As such, they
were engaged in a business pursuit. Therefore, the
Business Pursuit Exclusionary Clause applies." £d. at
753.
Smyth v. USAA, 5 Cal.App. 4th 1470, 7 Cal.Rptr. 2d 694 (2d
Dist. 1992), involved the insured's activities as an outside
director of a corporation and USAA's homeowners and umbrella
policies.

Smyth was sued because of injuries suffered in a hotel

fire at a hotel owned by the corporation on whose board Smyth was
a director.

The court assumed there was no profit motive in

being a director and that Smyth in fact received no compensation.
The court found the insured had no reasonable expectation of
coverage under the policies.

The court stated:

"Such activities

cannot be considered 'usual to non-business pursuits.'"
697.

Id. at

Regarding the lack of profit motive, the court wrote:
"Regardless how benevolent Smyth's own motivations were
or how minimal his involvement, the activity involved
is a business activity subject to exclusion under these
policies." Id. at 697. (Emphasis added).
California Mutual Ins. Co. v. Robertsons, 262 Cal.Rptr. 173

(Cal.App. 5th Dist. 1989), involved insureds who were sued for
negligently supervising their agent in certain real estate
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investment transactions.

The court concluded that this part-time

activity conducted through an agent whom they had used on two or
three occasions for investments, constituted a business pursuit
under the homeowners exclusion.

Regarding the part-time nature

of the activity, the court stated:
"The business engaged in need not be the sole occupation; part-time business activities are also included
under a business pursuits exclusion." Id. at 179.
Calame now says that he did not consider his involvement
with the book part of his private investigation business.

The

undisputed facts are, however, that Calame, for well more than a
decade, had been in the business of private investigations (see
Calame's own undisputed fact number 2) (Record at 111), and that
his tasks that got him sued by Ms. McCoy included "research of
newspaper clippings and other documents" and conducting
"interviews of people with knowledge of the crimes" (see Calame's
own undisputed fact number 8) (Record at 113). Calame's own
undisputed facts establish that what he did was part of his
private business, and that what he did was "investigation."
Calame now says that he "never opened a file on the matter," but
his own undisputed facts establish that he researched newspaper
clippings and other documents, conducted interviews of people
with knowledge of the crimes, and entered into the written
contract that is attached in the Addendum at Tab A.

Calame

claims that he didn't bill Rhodes or anyone else or itemize or
charge anyone for expenses.

However, his written contractual
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agreement with Rhodes, Addendum at Tab A, specifically addresses
how Calame was going to get paid--he didn't need to keep track of
his time or itemize or charge anyone for expenses.
Calame claims he never expected the book to generate any
revenue, but the claim is irrelevant.

Calame himself testified

that the reason he entered into the contract with Rhodes was so
that his heirs would be protected and wouldn't have to fight over
the money.

(Calame depo, page 53, line 18 to page 5 line 10.)

In any event, Calame's own undisputed fact 14 establishes that he
did in fact receive revenue from his efforts.

(Record at 114.)

In our case, the lower court properly ruled that Calame's
research on the book D.B. Cooper, The Real McCoy was a business
pursuit.

It was appropriate for the lower court to grant summary

judgment that there is, therefore, no coverage and no duty to
defend.
POINT III
THE BUSINESS PURSUIT EXCLUSIONS CLEARLY AND
UNAMBIGUOUSLY PRECLUDE COVERAGE.
The business pursuit exclusions are clear and unambiguous
and preclude coverage in this case.

See Black v. Fireman's Fund

American Ins. Co., 767 P.2d 824, 827 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)
("Construing the language of the policy according to its plain
and ordinary meaning, we believe the intent and purpose of the
[business pursuit] exclusion are clear.").

But even if the

language of the exclusions were ambiguous, "it would not mean
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that coverage automatically existed.

Rather, the question would

be whether any reasonable interpretation of the 'business
pursuit' exclusion would fail to encompass the [activity]. . . ."
Id.

Based upon the foregoing argument, USAA maintains that

Calame's work on the book D.B. Cooper, The Real McCoy, would be
excluded under any reasonable interpretation of the insurance
policy's provisions.
Calame cites several Utah cases for the proposition that
ambiguities in insurance contracts should be construed against
the insurer and in favor of coverage.

Granted this is the

general rule, but those cases do not, however, address the
ambiguity or plain and ordinary meaning of business pursuit
exclusions in standard homeowner's policies.

Further, as stated,

the rule has no application when the language is clear and
unambiguous, as it is here.
Calame offers a letter from an "expert" as to the "expert's"
"opinion" as to the "intent" of the business pursuit exclusion.
The concept of introducing letters from "experts" as to their
"opinions" as to the "intent" of languages in insurance policies
is fallacious.

First, the opinion is irrelevant and immaterial

if the policy language is, as here, clear and unambiguous.
Second, as anyone who has worked in the American judicial system
for more than about five days knows, if one has $500, one can
obtain any "expert" "opinion" one desires.

Third, if insurers

and insureds were to determine the "intent" of policies, an
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extremely unwise proposition in the first place, by resorting to
"opinions" of hired "experts," no insurer or insured would ever
know what they had bargained for without resort to the judicial
system and the concomitant purchased opinions of experts. The
letter of Mr. Kahn offering his "opinion" as to the "intent" of
the applicable policies is irrelevant and immaterial, and was
correctly disregarded by the trial court.

The business pursuit

exclusions at issue here clearly and unambiguously preclude
coverage.
Mr. Kahn's opinions are irrelevant and immaterial.

It is

irrelevant and immaterial what Mr. Kahn thinks the "intention" of
the business pursuits exclusion is. The policy is clear and
unambiguous on its face.

Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court

has a vastly different opinion of the purpose of the business
exclusion in a homeowner's policy.

As discussed above, in Fire

Insurance Exchange v. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389 (Utah 1985), the Court
stated that the primary purpose of a homeowner's policy is to
provide package coverage for exposures incidental to home
ownership, and not to provide malpractice, professional or
business liability insurance.

It is impossible to see how

Mr, Calame's activity that got him sued was incidental to home
ownership, and clearly it was not.

The exclusions are clear and

unambiguous, and preclude coverage in this case.
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10.

Conclusion containing a statement of the relief sought.
The lower court properly concluded that there were no

genuine issues of material fact, that on the undisputed material
facts USAA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that,
because of the applicable business pursuit exclusions from
coverage, Calame had no coverage under his policy with USAA, and
that USAA had no duty to defend Calame in the underlying Karen
Burns McCoy action.

The Order and Judgment of the lower court

should be affirmed. .
DATED this

day of October, 1993.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Robert H. Henderson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
USAA
RHH596
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ADDENDUM
Tab A -

Calame/Rhodes "Contractual Agreement"

Tab B -

University of Utah Press Memorandum of Agreement

Tab C -

"D.B. Cooper - The Real McCoy" dust cover

Tab D -

The lower court's Memorandum Decision*

Tab E -

The Order and Judgment

*The parties agree that the lower court's Memorandum Decision
mistakenly refers to Calame as defendant and USAA as plaintiff,
See Appellate's Brief at page 8, footnote 2.
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Tab A

Contractural AgreementThis agreement is* entered into voluntarily by Bernie* A. Rhodes
and Russell~P. Calame in connection with their joint effort and endeavor
to produce a book suitable for publication concerning the skyjackings
by Richard Ployd McCoy in 1972 and an individual generally spoken of
as D. B. Cooper, in 1971- For the purposes of this agreement, the V
following is set'forthi
Rhodes first talked about writing a book on these sky packings in about
the mid 1970fs and asked Calame if he would be interested in helping,
Calame said he would*
During the years 1983 and 1984, Rhodes prepared about 100 pages of
manuscript which was furnished to Calame in about early I985 for
his observations and suggestions. Calame reviewed the material
and made several observations.
In 1985, Rhodes and Calame discussed further work.on the intended book;
it was agreed that Rhodes would continue in the writing and Calame
would handle the research and investigation necessary to establish
and verify the facts and "details as much as'possible. They agreed
they would each keep a record of expenses attributable to -this
endeavor; further, they agreed neither of them would submit any
charges' or costs due to the personal time expended by them.
Further, they agreed that If the book produced any revenue, each
would it'emize his expenses and these would be paid first. Thereafter,
any monies available would be paid out on the basis of 75£ to Rhodes
as the author and 25^ to Calame as the researcher. This'split
shall apply to any monies received from the endeavor,, whether it
is from a book, hard and/or soft cover, -movie, TV broadcast, serializations of programs or other form.
Further, if there are any
costs due to the use of an Agent to sell or promote this endeavor,
the costs of such Agent will be apportioned 75£ payable by Rhodes and
25^ payable by Calame.
In 1987, Rhodes and Calame paid for the transportation .of Kelvin
Dale Walter from Houston to Salt Lake City and return and further,
paid Walker for* some written data he furnished. At the time of
meeting with Walker, it was agreed Walker would be given a written
contract to be executed by Rhodes and Walker. This contract is in
preparation. When completed and signed by both parties, it will be
made a part of this agreement, since it also involves Calame.
At the time the oral agreement was entered into in I985 by Rhodes and
Calame, neither felt the need to reduce the agreement to writing. Now,
because of advancing age, the possible time delay in publication and
the uncertainties of life itself, both'desire that a written agreement
and contract should be entered into .and therefore, i^^irthepance of
this desiret each has in the pr^seTTC'e^oi* witnesses,/signed ^ i b w .
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Witnessi

Russell P. Calame, 4411 Parkview Drive
Salt Lake 'City, Utah 8412k
James A. Stewart
. *

Witnes-j

Roger D. Sandack
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TEE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH YtfESS
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
This Agreement is made as of September 5, 1990 by and between Bernie
Rhodes (hereinafter called the Author, and if there is more than one author
then all of them collectively) and the University of Utah Press, a division of
the University of Utah, located at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah
(hereinafter called the Publisher), to publish and market a book now entitled
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT CD. B. COOPER - NO LONGER A MYSTERY)
(hereinafter called t h e Vork).
THE AUTHOR AND THE PUBLISHER AGREE AS F0LL0VS:
Author's Grant

1.

The Author hereby grants, assigns, and transfers to the Publisher the
exclusive right to manufacture and publish the Vork and all rights to
the Vork, including but without limitation all common law rights,
copyrights, and the right to secure copyright in the United States and
all other countries of the world in the name of the Publisher, together
with the exclusive right to sell the Vork during -the term of such
copyright in all languages throughout the world.

Author's
Warranty

2.

The Author warrants that he or she is the sole author and proprietor
of the Vork and has full power to make this agreement; that the Vork
has "not been published except as may be stated in paragraph 21 of this
Agreement; that the Vork does not infringe any copyright or violate
any proprietary rights, or contain any scandalous or libelous matter,
or invade the privacy of any person; and that no right in the Vork has
in any way been sold, mortgaged, or otherwise disposed of, and that
the Vork is free from all liens and claims. The Author agrees to defend,
indemnify, and to hold harmless the Publisher against all claims,
demands, suits, ' losses, damages, costs, and expenses, including
reasonable attorney's fees, that the Publisher may sustain or incur from
any breach of the Author's warranties and representations
hereunder.

Delivery of
Manuscript

3.

The Author shall deliver the complete manuscript of the Vork not later
than X5 December 1990. "Manuscript" shall be understood to mean text
and all art (defined as photographs, drawings, maps, charts, graphs,
tables and other illustrative material) to be included in the Vork. If the
Author shall fail to make delivery by that date, the Publisher shall be
released from all obligations under this Agreement unless it has advised
the Author in writing of its willingness to postpone the delivery date;
but the Author shall not be free to cause or permit publication of the
Vork elsewhere before reoffering it to the Publisher under the terms
of this Agreement.

Content of
•Manuscript

4.

The manuscript shall consist of approximately 450 double-spaced
typewritten pages of t e n and 20 black-and-white photographs.

Form of Manuscript

5.

The Author shall supply the text of the manuscript electronically coded
on IBH/M5 DOS-compatible word processing disks, accompanied by a
single hard copy produced therefrom; and shall supply art in draft
form suitable for editing.

R 00002
Permissions

The Author shall obtain all permissions and pay all permission fees for
the use of text or art controlled by others, and shall supply the
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I\_^isher with written evidence of V^> copyright owners' authorization
to use the materials at the time the manuscript is delivered.
Acceptance and
Agreement to
Publish

7.

Following formal acceptance of the Vork by the Faculty Advisory
Committee of the University of Utah Press, the Publisher shall publish
the Vork at its own expense vrtthin a reasonable time in such form as
it deems best suited for sale of the Vork.

CODV

Editing
find Proofreading

8»

The Publisher shall copyedit the manuscript and send it to the Author
for reading and correction. The Author shall return the corrected
manuscript to the Publisher within four weeks. At this time the Author
shall supply all art previously submitted In draft form in final form
suitable for reproduction. This will be the Author's final opportunity
to see the manuscript and to make changes without cost. After the text
of the manuscript has been set in type, the Author will read and correct
galley proofs, and return these to the Publisher within three weeks.
The Publisher will read and correct page proofs; these will not be sent
to the Author.

Author's
Alterations

9.

The cost of alterations made in the proofs by the Author (exclusive of
Publisher's errors) shall be charged to the Author.

Index

10.

If the Vork is to contain an index, the Publisher will prepare one at
its own expense.

Protection of
the Vork

11.

The Author shall not publish or furnish to any other publisher without
the Publisher's written consent any version of the Vork or any work
of a similar character tending to conflict with the sale of the Vork
covered by this Agreement,

Statements of
SaJes

12.

Following publication of the Vork, the Publisher shall submit to the
Author, on or before the last day of August each year, statements of
the number of copies of the Vork sold during the preceding July l to
June 30 year.

Royalties

13.

At the time of submitting such statements of sales, the Publisher shall
pay the Author, after deducting all expenses .chargeable to the Author,
the following royalties based on the net sales of the Vork (net sales
being defined as sales, less returns, at list price less standard
discounts) and accrued to the account of the Author during the
preceding July 1 to June 30 year:
On case bound copies: 10%.
On paperback copies: 7-1/2X.

Royalty-free
copies

14.

No royalty shall be paid on any copies lost or destroyed, or on damaged
or overstocked copies sold at or below manufacturing cost, or on cones
given away for the purpose of rflding the sale of the Vork, or on cooies
given or sold to the Author.

Subsidiary
Rights

15.

The Author grants and assigns to the Publisher the full, sole, and
exclusive right to arrange for the sale or licensing of the rights to *ne
Vorki including but without limitation book club rights; reprint r.f*\s.
foreign rights; translation rights; serial rights; selection, ebndfae-t
condensation, digest and adaptation rights; syndication rights; dra z** .r
motion picture, and television rights; broadcast rights; recordir.f r * -* <
electronic transmission, storage and retrieval rights; mechan:ra *• j
visual reproduction rights; and permission rights (quotations, exr<*-; • v

R 00003

University of Utah Press Heoorandunrof Agreement
KAR

10

'92

17:00

5 September 1990
801

p. 2 of 4

359 9004

PAGE.004

xUV^^ti 0113 ^ The net amount of anx^mpensation received from such
disposition will be divided equally between Author and Publisher (after
all ipanufacturing costs, commissions, foreign taxes, and other charges
have been deducted) in lieu of royalties.
Author's, Copies

16.

The Publisher shall give .the Author & total of 15 free copies of the
Vork. The Author shall have the right to purchase additional copies
of the Vork for personal use only, and not for resale, at a discount of
forty percent (40%) from list price.

TgrtmnaHnn

17.

If the Publisher falls to keep the work in print and fails to reprint
within six months of the Author's written request to do so, then the
Author may terminate this Agreement by written notice, and all rights
granted to the Publisher shall revert to the Author. Vithin thirty days
of such termination, the Author shall have the right to purchase, at"
twenty-five percent of oost, the plates or film of the Vork. should any
then exist, and to purchase at actual manufacturing cost any. copies
and/or sheets of the Vork remaining with the Publisher. Thereafter the
Publisher may dispose of this material at its discretion without liability
to the Author.

Notification

18. ' All notices which may be proper and necessary for the parties hereto
to serve on each other may be served effectually in writing by mail at
the last-known post-office address of either party.

Duration of
Agreement

19.

This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the
heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of both parties, and shall
continue for the duration of the original copyright of the Vork, of
copyrights of all revisions and abridgments, and of all renewals
thereof.

Assignment

20.

This Agreement may be assigned by either party with the written
consent of the other, and the assignee thereof shall have* all of'the
rights and remedies of the original parties. But this Agreement shall
be assigned only as a whole and not as a part, and may not be assigned
as to any part interest therein.

Special
Provjsjpng

21.

None.

INVTTNESS VHEREOjvtbe parties hereunder have caused this instrument to
day and year first hereinabove written.

Author 2
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Author 3
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Authorized Signature
ignature
University of Utah
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Author .1

Social Security No. V&T-cJTb V ^ £

Home Address:

Citizenship

^^tf/f//&,ie

*?/S~*

Date of Birth <S~-S=-^tSLAuthor 2

Social Security No.

M&**

AJ)^

-yj1^

S C C

/rV/d^T

Home Address:

Citi2enship _ _ _ _ _
Date of Birth
Author 3

Social Security No. _

Home Address:

Citizenship _ _ _ _ _
Date of Birth,
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Russell P. Calame,
Plaintiff,
vs.
United Services Automobile Association,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO: 920902185 CV
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

Now before the Court are plaintiff and defendant's Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment. The Court has reviewed the memos filed in connection with the motions, has heard
oral argument and having taken the matter under advisement now rules as follows:
The Court will not repeat the facts of this matter as they have been thoroughly outlined
in the memos and are well known to the parties. Plaintiff claims that the injury complained of
in the underlying tort action arose out of defendant's business pursuits and is therefore excluded
from coverage under his home owners policy of insurance. Defendant responds that his efforts
at researching for the book in question was not a business pursuit within the meaning of the
exclusionary language of the policy and that since his activities were not a part of his regularly
conducted profession, by means of which he earned his livelihood, the insurance policy's
business exclusion does not apply.
The Court is of the opinion that when defendant entered into a contract to do research
and investigation to establish and verify facts in a joint effort to produce a book suitable for
publication, and where the contract outlined each parties share of any revenues that may be

C0280
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received from the sale of the book that defendant was clearly engaging in a business activity.
Defendant claims, however, that hisresearchand investigation for the book, was not part
of hisregularlyconducted activity by which he earns his livelihood. The Court is of the opinion
that there is no significant distinction between his efforts at researching and investigating facts
to be included in this book and his investigations for clients in a variety of other kinds of
matters. The fact that this investigation may have been for himself in his joint effort to produce
a book rather than for a third party client is not a significant fact.
The Court is further of the opinion that in order for the exclusion to apply the business
engaged in need not be the sole occupation of the insured. Part time activities may also be
included within the exclusionary language of the policy if those activities are indeed legitimate
business pursuits. Inasmuch as Mr. Caiame's efforts in this matter were clearly in pursuit of
a business interest the Court is of the opinion that the exclusionary language applies and
accordingly grants plaintiffs Motion and denies defendant's Motion.
The Court is of the opinion that the exclusionary language is not ambiguous, and
therefore feels that Mr. Kahn's affidavit is immaterial and will grant the Motion to Strike.
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it in
accordance with the local rules of practice.
Dated t h i s ^ / (

day of April, 1993.

Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge

I *£. %£-y?^ v *
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a trae and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following on this Q-/

day of April, 1993.

Carman E. Kipp
Kirk G. Gibbs
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Robert H. Henderson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

vf*s<,
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ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL P. CALAME,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE
ASSOCIATION,

Civil No.

920902135

Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendant.

Cross Motions for Summary Judgment came on regularly
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial
Administration.

The Court having thoroughly reviewed the file,

including the cross Motions for Summary Judgment and Memoranda,
and the Court having fully heard oral argument, and the Court
being fully advised in the premises:
The Court is of the opinion that when Russell P. Calame
entered into a contract to do research and investigation to
establish and verify facts in a joint effort to produce a book
suitable for publication, and where the contract outlined each
party's share of any revenues that may be received from the sale

C0?-S3

of the book that Russell P. Calame was clearly engaging in a
business activity.
The Court is of the opinion that there is no significant
distinction between Russell P. Calame!s efforts at researching
and investigating facts to be included in this book and his
investigations for clients in a variety of other kinds of
matters.

The fact that this investigation may have been for

himself in his joint effort to produce a book rather than for a
third-party client is not a significant fact.
The Court is further of the opinion that in order for
exclusion to apply to business engaged in need not be the sole
occupation of the insured.

Part time activities may also be

included within the exclusionary language of the policy if those
activities are indeed legitimate business pursuits.

Inasmuch as

Richard P. Calamefs efforts in this matter were clearly in
pursuit of a business interest, the Court is of the opinion that
the exclusionary language applies.
The Court is of the opinion that the exclusionary language
is not ambiguous.
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:

1.

That USAAfs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Mr. Kahn

be, and hereby is granted;
2.

That USAA's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and hereby

is granted;

-2-
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3.

That Russell P. Calamefs Motion for Summary Judgment be,

and hereby is denied.
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that:

Judgment be, and hereby is entered in favor of USAA and
against Russell P. Calame, no cause of action, and that the acts
of which Karen Burns McCoy complains in the underlying action are
not covered under Russell P. Calame's insurance policy with USAA,
and that USAA has no duty to defend Russell P. Calame in the
underlying action.
DATED this

y

ik

A A,
day of~Apr±T*, 1993.
BY THE COURT

FRANK G.
DISTRICT

-3\.* J *.* *- **

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys
for defendant herein; that she served the attached Proposed ORDER
AND JUDGMENT (Case Number 920902135, Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County) upon the parties listed below
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Carman E. Kipp
Kirk G. Gibbs
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
and causing the same to be hand-delivered on the 29th day of
April, 1993.

Donna Campbell
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 29th day of April,
1993.

Residing in the State of Utah
My Commission Expires:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this

day of October, 1993, two true and correct

copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, to the following:
Carman E. Kipp
Kirk G. Gibbs
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Robert H. Henderson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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